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I. The Problem with Software Patents
In October 2004, a federal jury found that Sun Microsystems'
Java programming language violated a patent owned by the Eastman
Kodak Corporation. This decision was notable for two reasons: first,
it was a high-profile patent case between large corporations that
* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, 2006. The
author would like to thank Julie A. Glynn and Michael
Wells for their support during this project.
1. Keith Regan, Kodak Asks Jury for $1 Billion in Sun-Java Patent Case, TECH.
NEWS, Oct. 4,2004, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/news/37077.html.
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involved a potential billion-dollar damages award 2 and second, this
case involved a software patent, a new and relatively controversial
form of intellectual property.3 Kodak purchased the patent at issue
from Wang Laboratories Inc. in 1997. The patent covered a method
by which one computer program can "ask for help" from another
4program. Although Sun Microsystems subsequently settled the case
for $92 million5 before the jury could decide on a damages award, the
case can be seen as a warning sign for intellectual property and patent
law jurisprudence that there are flaws in the assignment and
adjudication of software patents in the United States.
To say that there is a problem with the current US software
patent system is relatively uncontroversial.6  However, many
commentators have overlooked that the US patent system is a system,
comprised of government agencies, patent agents and attorneys,
patent holders, and federal courts. In order to determine where there
is a problem with the software patent system, the parts of the system
need to be individually examined. As explained below, while most of
the focus has been on the role of courts, there are opportunities for
significant improvement of the overall system through changes in the
prosecution of software patents.
Part II of this note will examine the historical development of
software as patentable subject matter in the federal courts, from the
"progress of Science and useful Arts" language of the Constitution7 to
modern electronic computing and data storage devices through
federal court decisions from Diamond v. Deihr8 to State Street Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.9 Part III will discuss how
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has been interpreted at the
2 Id.
3. See Robert Plotkin, Computer Programming and the Automation of Invention: A
Case for Software Patent Reform, 2003 UCLA J.L.&TECH., 7 (2003).
4. Ben Rand, Kodak Wins Java Lawsuit, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT AND
CHRONICLE, Oct. 2, 2004, http://www.rochesterdandc.com/apps
/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20041002JBUSINESS/410020333&SearchlD=731856.
5. Maureen O'Gara, As Sun Settles Kodak's Java Patents Suit, What's Microsoft
Thinking?, LINux Bus. WK., Oct. 12,2004, http://java.sys-con.com/read/46702-p.htm.
6. See Richard S. Gruner, Everything Old Is New Agairn Obviousness Limitations on
Patenting Computer Updates of Old Designs, 9 B.U.J. ScI. & TECH. L. 209, 212 (2003);
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002); James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., March 12,
2000, http://www.around.com/patent.html.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
9. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and
incorporated into the "Examination Guidelines for Computer
Related Inventions."' Part IV will discuss the legal and business
application of these rules in the real world. Finally, Part V will discuss
the problems associated with the current software patent process and
propose modifications to the procedure for grant and review of
software patents that will place an emphasis on early detection of
prior art in prosecution before the USPTO.
H. Legal Developments In Software Patents
A. Constitutional and Statutory Definition of Patentable Materiel
The origin of patent legislation is the United States Constitution,
which directs congress to "Promote the Progress of Science and
Useful arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.""
This guarantee of a limited monopoly for inventors followed the
established common law tradition of rewarding inventors with
exclusive rights to the manufacture and sale of their inventions for
limited times in exchange for publishing the details of their
inventions.12 Publication of patents serves two goals: it places new
inventions into public knowledge where other inventors can make use
of current inventions as inspiration for future inventions, and
publication provides notice to other inventors of what is protected
1 3
As part of a patent application, the inventor is required to disclose
both a general description of the invention and the "best mode"
implementation of the invention as conceived by the inventor. 4 In
exchange for public disclosure, the inventor is granted a limited
monopoly over the manufacture, use, sale, and importation of the
invention. 5
The first Congress codified United States patent law in the
Patent Act of 1790 which laid the groundwork for all subsequent
10. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPT. OF COMM., EXAMINATION
GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTER-RELATED INVENTIONS, (1995), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/pac/compexam/examcomp.html
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
12. The English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, §6, provided a 14-year
monopoly to the inventor of "any manner of new manufactures."
13. Of the two goals, the notice function presents a significant problem with respect
to current software patent scheme. See discussion infra Part IV.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003).
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patent legislation.16 Although there are some notable differences
between the 1970 Act and current patent law,17 many features of
modern patent law are retained from the Act of 1790. Patents were to
be granted on any "useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or
device, or any improvement therein not before known or used, '8 and
applicants were required to submit a specification containing an
explanation and model of each invention that provides sufficient
detail to distinguish the new invention from the prior art and permit
one skilled in the art to create the new invention. 9
Congress has recodified the patent law several times since 17 90,
2
0
but the basic system of granting a limited monopoly to inventors of
novel, useful, inventions has remained unchanged. With one minor
exception,2' the definition of patentable subject matter has remained
unchanged since 1793-"any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof."' In addition to the statutory definition of
patentable materiel, the other major limitations on patenting a new
invention relevant to this Note are that an invention must be novel
2 3
and non-obvious.24
The next section will discuss the application of the above
described statutory patent law to software patents. It is worth noting,
however, that without any additional information computer software
appear to be patentable. A software-controlled machine appears to fit
16. ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109-112 (April 10, 1790) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2003)).
17. The original patent examiners were the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War,
and the Attorney General; patents were certified by the President. Id.
M8 Id.
19. Id. § 2.
20. See generally The Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323 (February 21, 1793);
The Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117; The Patent Act of 1952, S. REP. No. 82-1979,
§ 4 (1952).
21. The word "art" was replaced by "process" in the 1952 Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2003).
22. Id.
23. Novelty is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 102. The most relevant portion of the definition
with relation to software prior art is subsection (a), that prohibits the patenting of an
invention "known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant." 35
U.S.C. § 102(a) (2003).
24. Obviousness is fully defined in 35 U.S.C § 103. In general, an invention is not
patentable if "the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter
pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2003).
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the definition of a "new and useful ... machine" ' and software itself
likewise appears to fit the definition of a "new and useful process."
26
The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, in a thirty-year
progression from Benson27 to State Street Bank,2 eventually arrived at
this conclusion.
B. Case Law
1. Benson, Flook, and the Freeman-Walter-Abele test
The Supreme Court has, until relatively recently, been skeptical
of claims involving software or computer algorithms. Benson was one
of the first Supreme Court cases that dealt with an attempt to patent a
software algorithm. 29 The respondents in Benson attempted to patent
a computer algorithm used to convert numbers from binary coded
decimal (BCD) notation into pure binary numbers.3° The USPTO
rejected claims directed to the BCD-to-pure-binary computer
process, but these claims were reinstated by the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals.31
Justice Douglas began the Benson opinion by noting "while a
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a
patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid
of knowledge of scientific truth may be." 32 Douglas then reviewed the
history of process patents and the gradual expansion of patentable
subject matter between 1854 and 1972."3 In rejecting the process
claims, Douglas wrote that upholding the process claims would have
the "practical effect" of patenting an idea and "the patent would
wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect
would be a patent on the algorithm itself." 4 The opinion questioned
the validity of software patents in general,35 and noted several
practical difficulties with prosecuting software patents.
6
25. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2003).
26. Id.
27. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
28. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d at 1368.
29. Benson, 409 U.S. at 64.
30. Id. at 65-66.
31. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971). The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (C.C.P.A.) was the predecessor to the Federal Circuit.
32. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (quoting Mackay Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94
(1939)).
33. Id. at 68-71.
34. Id. at 71-72.
35. "It may be that the patent laws should be extended to cover these programs, a
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After Benson, there was considerable confusion about what
types of software patents would be allowed.-7 The Benson opinion
stated "program" patents were not unpatentable,m but did not
provide guidance as to what would constitute a patentable software
invention. The only firm rule that emerged from Benson was that a
patent involving a "mathematical formula"3 9 that had the "practical
effect"' of patenting the algorithm itself was not permitted.
In 1978, the C.C.P.A. used the above interpretation of Benson in
its analysis of a claim to a computer process that would automatically
update an alarm limit in a chemical hydrocarbon conversion process.41
The C.C.P.A. phrased the question at issue in Flook as "whether a
claim to a process which uses an algorithm to modify a conventional
manufacturing system is statutory subject matter."42 In answering this
question in the affirmative, the C.C.P.A. first interpreted its own
decision in Christiansen43 as being limited to cases in which the
process of solving the algorithm itself is the claimed invention and
nothing is done after solution of the algorithm.44 The C.C.P.A. then
found that Benson applied only to claims that would "wholly pre-
empt a mathematical formula." 45 The claim at issue in Flook did not
implicate Benson, according to the C.C.P.A., because it involved the
use of an algorithm in a manufacturing process and "solution of the
algorithm, per se, would not infringe the claim." 46
The Supreme Court reversed the C.C.P.A. in Parker v. Flook.47
The Court rejected the C.C.P.A.'s narrow interpretation of Benson
policy matter to which we are not competent to speak." Id. at 72.
36. Douglas noted that the Patent Office "cannot examine applications for programs
because of a lack of classification technique and the requisite search files ... reliable
searches would not be feasible ... because of the tremendous volume of prior art," and
that without a proper prior art search program patents "would be tantamount to mere
registration and the presumption of validity would be all but nonexistent." Id. Thirty-three
years later, the USPTO is still grappling with these issues.
37. See Id.
3& Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
39. Id. at 71-72.
40. Id.
41. In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 22 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
42 Id. at 22.
43. In re Christiansen, 478 F.2d 1392, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (holding that "a method
claim in which the point of novelty is a mathematical equation to be solved as the final
step of the method" is not statutory subject matter).
44. See fook, 559 F.2d at 22.
45. Id. at 23 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 72).
46. Id.
47. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
[28:287
and stated a process claim that "implements a principle in some
specific fashion" does not "automatically fall[] within the patentable
subject matter of § 101.""9 Flook's claim was nonstatutory under
section 101, not because it involved a mathematical algorithm, but
because "the application, considered as a whole, contains no
patentable invention."' The specific chemical process at issue, using
variable alarm limits to regulate processes in general, and use of
computers to calculate alarm limits in general, were all known in the
art.5 The Court held: 1) use of a computer to regulate the alarm limits
in this specific process was not novel,52 and 2) "if a claim is directed
essentially to a method of calculating, using a mathematical formula,
even if the solution is for a specific purpose, the claimed method is
nonstatutory. 53
As in Benson, the Court noted that its decision was not a
complete bar on software patents. 4 Flook was based "to a large
extent" on precedent disfavoring software patents.55 The Court held
open the possibility that software may comprise statutory subject
matter, but the decision involves "[d]ifficult questions of policy" that
were better addressed by Congress than a court. 6
The Supreme Court's decisions in Benson and Flook caused the
C.C.P.A. to develop what eventually became the Freeman-Walter-
Abele57 test to identify unpatentable mathematical algorithms.
Freeman-Walter-A bele is a two part test:
"First, the claim is analyzed to determine whether a mathematical
algorithm is directly or indirectly recited. Next, if a mathematical
algorithm is found, the claim as a whole is further analyzed to
determine whether the algorithm is applied in any manner to a
physical elements or process steps, and, if it is, it passes muster
under § 101.''58
4& Id. at 593.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 594.
51. Id.
52 Id. at 594-95. However, note that the Court acknowledges that the claim provided
"a new and presumably better method for calculating alarm limit values." Id. Such a claim
would likely be statutory under 35 U.S.C. § 101 today.




57. See In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
5& In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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The test represented an attempt by the C.C.P.A. to adhere to the
Supreme Court's decision in Flook while, at the same time, leaving
the door open for software patents. Flook prohibited patents that
involved a calculation as nonstatutory; Freeman-Walter-A bele
acknowledged this limitation but permitted mathematical algorithm
patents that involved the application of an algorithm to a physical
process. The test has been criticized as misleading, 9 and ultimately
had little relevance due to the Supreme Court's abrupt change of
heart regarding software patents in Diehr.6°
2. The Diehr Case
Diamond v. Diehr is the Supreme Court's last decision involving
software patents. Before Diehr, the Court had clarified its position on
the permitted scope of patents under section 101 in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty.61 Chakrabarty involved patent claims directed to a
genetically modified bacterium. 62 In a reversal of earlier Supreme
Court jurisprudence, the Chakrabarty Court chided lower courts for
"read[ing] into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the
legislature had not expressed." ' The Court identified Congressional
intent for section 101 to "include anything under the sun that is made
by man." ' The only exceptions to this broad interpretation of section
101 is for "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas."
6
1
The Court applied its interpretation of section 101 directly to a
patent "which includes in several of its steps the use of a
mathematical formula and a programmed digital computer ' 66 in
Diehr. Diehr's patent included process claims for that covered the use
of a computer to monitor the curing of rubber in heated molds.67 The
patent examiner rejected these claims "on the sole ground they were
59. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543-44 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (§ 101 patentability analysis
should be directed to a claim in its entirety is statutory subject matter and not to whether
part of a claim would be nonstatutory by itself).
60. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
61. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
62 Id. at 305-06.
63. Id. at 308 (quoting U.S. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933)).
64. Id. at 309 (citing S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No.
1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952)).
65. Id.
66. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177-78 (claims recited the use of a temperature probe,





drawn to nonstatutory subject matter under [section 101]."61 The
C.C.P.A. reversed in In re Diehr,69 noting that the claims were to a
process and that an otherwise allowable claim is not invalidated
because it uses a computer.70 The Commission of Patents and
Trademarks appealed to the Supreme Court on the argument that the
C.C.P.A.'s decision was inconsistent with Benson and Flook.
The Court began by noting that the process of converting raw
rubber into a cured, finished part is an industrial process "which have
historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent
laws."71 Agreeing with the Federal Circuit, the Court noted that a
process claim is not rendered nonstatutory by "the fact that in several
steps of the process a mathematical equation and a programmed
digital computer are used."72 Turning to its decisions in Benson and
Flook, the Court stated that they did not represent a bar on software
patents but stood for the "long established principles" that laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.73
Benson involved a computer algorithm used to solve a type of
mathematical equation that "is like a law of nature, which cannot be
subject to a patent." 74 In Flook the court concluded that the claims
were drawn only to the formula for calculating an "alarm limit" and
not to the use of that limit in a process.
71
The Court reasoned that Diehr was different, "the respondents
here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula ... they seek
patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber." 76 The fact
that the claimed process used a well-known mathematical equation
and a computer did not affect the section 101 analysis. 7 Of particular
importance was that Diehr did not seek to patent every use of the
Arrhenius equation in a computer, only its use as part of a larger
process of curing rubber.78
Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marhsall, and Blackmun disputed this
conclusion. They argued in dissent that the claims at issue were not a
6& Id. at 179.
69. 602 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
70. Id. at 984.
71. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184.
72 Id. at 185.
73. Id.; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
74. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186.
75. Id. at 186-87.
76. Id. at 187.
77. Id.
78. "[Respondents] seek only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in
conjunction with all the other steps in the claimed process." Id.
2006]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
process but a computer algorithm for measuring cure time, similar to
the algorithm for calculating "alarm limits" rejected in Flook as
nonstatutory under section 101.79 Because the only novel portion of
the process, use of the computer, was nonstatutory, the entire claim is
invalid under section 101.80
3. From Diehr to Alappat
Although the implications of Diehr were broad, in that for the
first time the Supreme Court upheld a patent that included a
computer program, the actual holding was rather narrow. Diehr did
not hold that software was patentable subject matter, only that the
inclusion of software in a process claim was not fatal.8' The precise
boundaries of how, and if, software was to be afforded patent
protection was left to later cases.
Between 1981 and 1994, the C.C.P.A. (and its successor, the
Federal Circuit) applied the Freeman-Walter-Abele test2 to determine
the validity of computer-related claims. As a result, patent
practitioners developed what one commentator called "the doctrine
of magic words,"' phrasing any computer- or software-related
invention in terms of a tangible object to satisfy the second prong of
Freeman-Walter-A bele. Although the standard was not entirely clear,
the C.C.P.A. and Federal Circuit generally upheld claims involving
computer software that had a tangible relation to physical elements or
tangible steps.84
The Federal Circuit significantly changed the software patent
analysis in 1994. 8' Alappat and his co-inventors developed a
computerized method of smoothing out the waveform display of an
oscilloscope. 86 Claim 15, the key claim in Alappat's application,
claimed the new method ("a rasterizer") in means-plus-function
79. Id. at 209-10.
80. Id. at 216. The dissent also argued that a computer program would be
nonstatutory under the disfavored "mental steps" and "function of a machine" tests, id. at
195-96, and that the courts should not be involved in deciding whether software is
statutory subject matter. Id. at 215-16.
81. Id. at 192-93.
82 See In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
83. Julie Cohen & Mark Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1, 9 (2001).
84. See Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1061
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding a computer that analyzes electrocardiograph signals was
statutory subject matter).
85. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
86. Id. at 1537.
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languageY An eight member"' panel of the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences ("the Board") rejected this claim for two reasons:
1) the claim should be interpreted as a mathematical algorithm
alone,89 and 2) because Claim 15 recited a mathematical algorithm
and not an application of a mathematical algorithm, it was
nonstatutory under section 101.90
The Federal Circuit, en banc, reversed the Board. 9' Citing
precedent, 92 the Federal Circuit stated that a means-plus-function
claim must be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112 as "cover[ing] the
corresponding structure ... described in the specification. '" 93 The
specification clearly describes the rasterizer as a machine comprised
of computerized units programmed to perform specific functions.94
Turning to the section 101 issue, the Federal Circuit explicitly
rejected the idea that claims which embodied "mathematical
algorithm[s]" were excepted from patent coverage. 95 Although a
mathematical algorithm itself is not patentable,9 Claim 15 involved "a
specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result."97
In conclusion, the majority opinion explicitly stated, "a computer
operating pursuant to software may represent patentable subject
matter, provided, of course, that the claimed subject matter meets all
of the other requirements of Title 35."98 Software patents, although
not fully endorsed by Alappat,99 were now one step closer to express
validity under section 101.1°°
87. Id. at 1538.
88. For an interesting discussion of the PTO Director's "expansion" of the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences to change the outcome of Alappat, see id. at 1530-36.
89. This interpretation ran counter to Federal Circuit precedent that limitations in
the specification should be imputed to claims in means-plus-function language. Id. at 1539.
90. Id. at 1540.
91. Id. at 1530.
92- See Arrhythmia Research Tech., 958 F.2d at 1060.
93. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1540 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112, (2003)).
94. Id. at 1541.
95. Id. at 1542.
96. Recall that the Supreme Court held that § 101 excludes laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from patent protection. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 309 (1980). A mathematical algorithm is unpatentable as either a law of nature or as
an abstract idea. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 (1981); Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63,71 (1972).
97. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
98. Id. at 1545.
99. The opinion states that the computer, and not the software itself, may be
patented; Id.
100. At least one commentator has noted that Alappat was not the revolution it
appeared to be, as the USPTO had already granted 10,000 software-related patents by
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4. State Street Bank and AT&T
The State Street Bank patent dealt with a computerized system
for pooling and tracking mutual fund assets.1 1 Multiple independent
mutual funds could use the system to pool their assets, permitting
them to lower transaction costs, while a computer kept track of each
fund's daily income, expenses, and trading history. 1°" Each of the six
claims at issue was written as a "machine" claim using means-plus-
function language.0 3 The Federal Circuit addressed three issues in
State Street Bank: 1) whether the claims were directed to statutory
subject matter; 2) whether the claims fall under the "mathematical
algorithm" exception to statutory subject matter;1' and 3) whether the
claims fall under the "business method" exception to statutory subject
matter.'a 5
The Federal Circuit held that all of the claims were drawn to
statutory subject matter under section 101."6 Following the Alappat
analysis, the court held that each claim was directed to a machine
when construed in connection with the limitations in the
specification. 1' The Federal Circuit rejected the district court's
contention that the claims were directed to a process, and noted that
this distinction was academic for a section 101 analysis because both
processes and machines are statutory subject matter under section
101.111
The court's application of the "mathematical algorithm"
exception began by noting that the exception applies to "abstract
ideas constituting disembodied concepts or truths that are not
useful."' 9 The application of a mathematical concept, such as the
oscilloscope in Alappat,"n or the heartbeat monitor in Arrhythmia
1994. See Lee A. Hollaar, Legal Protection of Digital Information, at http://digital-law-
online.info/lpdil.0/treatise64.html.
101. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
102 Id.
103. Id. at 1371. For example, claim 1 was directed to a data processing system that
included a "computer processor means," computer storage, and several "arithmetic logic
circuit[s]" that calculated share price, profit, and loss for each mutual fund. Id.
104. "[T]he [Supreme] Court has held that mathematical algorithms are not patentable
subject matter to the extent that they are merely abstract ideas." Id. at 1373.
105. Id. Several previous cases had suggested that a method of doing business can not
be afforded patent protection. See In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
106. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d at 1371.
107. Id.
10& Id. at 1372.
109. Id. at 1373 (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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Research Technology,"' is statutory subject matter because it applies a
mathematical concept in a useful way.'12
The court held that:
the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by
a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final
share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical
algorithm, formula, or calculation because it produces 'a useful,
concrete and tangible result'-a final share price momentarily fixed
for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied
upon by regulatory authorities in subsequent trades.
This sentence removed the requirement that a software claim be
tethered to a physical result, be it a cured rubber product or an output
on an oscilloscope. State Street Bank held that the transformation of
numbers, though mathematical calculations, is itself a statutory
"practical application" under section 101.114 At the same time, the
court repudiated the relevance of Freeman-Walter-A bele, stating that
it has "little, if any, applicability to determining the presence of
statutory subject matter."'' 5
Turning to the "business method" exception, the court took State
Street Bank as an opportunity to "lay this ill-conceived exception to
rest.',1 6 The court embraced Judge Newman's assertion that
patentability depends on "whether the method.., meets the
requirements of patentability as set forth in Sections 101, 102, 103,
and 112" 7 regardless of whether the method relates to a business.
Noting that the Federal Circuit had never invalidated a claim for the
business method exception, 8 the exception was subject to scholarly
criticism," 9 and that the USPTO removed the exception from the
Manual of Patent Examining Procedures,' 2° the court concluded that
business methods are statutory subject matter under section 101.121
111. Arrhythmia Research Technology Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
112- State Street Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d at 1373.
113. Id.
114. This may be an overly broad generalization. The court appears to place emphasis
on the fact that the numbers generated have a tangible effect on the outside world, i.e.
they are relied upon in financial transactions. See Id.
115. Id. at 1374.
116. Id. at 1375.
117. Id. at n. 10 (citing In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
11& Id. at 1375-76.
119. Id. at 1375.
120. Id. at 1376.
121. Id. at 1377.
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The Federal Circuit relied on State Street Bank in subsequent
decisions involving the section 101 validity of software patents. One
example is AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications.'2 A district court
invalidated AT&T's patent claims, covering the addition and use of a
primary interexchange carrier ("PIC") indicator 123  in
telecommunications, as a nonstatutory mathematical algorithm.1 24 The
Federal Circuit reversed, using the analysis put forth in State Street
Bank.125 Because AT&T's claims were written to a "process [that]
applies the Boolean principle to produce a useful, concrete, tangible,
result... the claimed process comfortably falls within the scope of
section 101.''26
C. Conclusion
The case history from Benson through Alappat shows several
trends in software patent jurisprudence: The Supreme Court has been
generally suspicious of permitting software-related patents,12 and the
Federal Circuit has generally been more lenient.'2 Within both courts,
there has been a gradual trend towards allowing software as
patentable material. This trend can be seen in the shift from exclusion
of software-related patents,129 to the Freeman-Walter-Abele analysis
based on physical elements,'o to an implicit recognition that a
programmed computer may be patentable.131 State Street Bank is the
last step in this trend, permitting the section 101 patentability of
software programmed into a digital computer that performs financial
calculations. 32 The current state of software patent jurisprudence is
represented by AT&T, with courts holding that software claims are
presumptively valid as either processes or machines.
122. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
123. A PIC is part of the record that a telephone company makes of a phone call. The
PIC field stores the name of the caller's long distance provider, which is used by a phone
company to determine billing charges. Id. at 1353-54.
124. Id. at 1354.
125. Id. at 1357.
126. Id.
127. See discussion infra Part LII.
128. Compare In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 22 (C.C.P.A. 1977), with Parker v. Hook, 437
U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
129. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
130. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 914 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
131. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
132 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
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III. The USPTO Guidelines for Software Patents
A. The USPTO Guidelines
In 1995, after Alappat and before State Street Bank, the USPTO
issued its Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions
("Examination Guidelines") 33 The Examination Guidelines lay out a
five step process for determining the validity of a computer-related
invention. The steps are:34
1. Determine what the applicant is seeking to patent.
2. Conduct a thorough search of the prior art.35
3. Determine if invention is statutory subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101.
4. Evaluate compliance with the written description and
enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
5. Determine compliance with requirements for novelty and non-
obviousness in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103.
The Examination Guidelines on statutory subject matter track
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit . jurisprudence. 136  The
Examination Guidelines stress that a computer program in the
abstract is non-statutory, but a program running on a computer is
statutory as a machine, and a program on a computer as part of a
larger process is statutory as a process.137 According to the
Examination Guidelines, "a process that merely manipulates an
abstract idea or performs a purely mathematical algorithm is non-
statutory."' 3 The Examination Guidelines review several types of
claim language, 39 but they do not place a great emphasis on the form
of the claims. "What is determinative is not how the computer
performs the process, but what the computer does to achieve a
practical application.' '"4 A practical application must do more than
133. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPT. OF COMM., EXAMINATION
GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTER-RELATED INVENTIONS - FINAL VERSION, (1995), at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/software/analysis/computer.html
134. Id. §i-iii.
135. The 41 page guide devotes a single paragraph to prior art, arguably the most
important part of the process. Id. at 6.
136. See id. at 6.
137. Id. at 8.
13& Id. at 18.
139. See id. at 16, 19, and 21.
140. Id. at 18.
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manipulate numbers and store them, the result must have some
"significant use., 141
Once an examiner has determined that the claims are drawn to
statutory subject matter, they are then directed to ensure that the
applicant's claims state the subject matter of the invention and
"particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention" according
to 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.' 4 Next, the examiner
determines if the application contains an adequate written
description, enablement, and discloses the inventors best mode
according to 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.43
The last step in evaluation under the Examination Guidelines is
to determine if the claimed invention is novel in light of the prior
art,'" and if it would have been obvious at the time of invention by
one skilled in the art. 45 Although the Examination Guidelines do not
go into great depth on this point, the examiner is supposed to apply
his or her search of the prior art to make the novelty determination
and his or her knowledge of computer science to make an
obviousness determination.
B. Conclusion
The Examination Guidelines tend to track the case law, at least
up to its 1995 publication date. A majority of the Examination
Guidelines is devoted to the section 101 statutory subject matter, 146 as
is a majority of the jurisprudence dealing with software patents.
Relatively little space is devoted to searching the prior art and
making an obviousness determination. As discussed below, this is the
main source of discontent with the current software patent system.
141. A "significant use" is "any activity which is more than merely outputting the
direct result of [a] mathematical operation." Id. at 21.
142. Id. at 23. The analysis is not significantly different for software and non-software
patents.
143. Id. The section 112 analysis is not significantly different between software and
non-software patents.
144. Id. at 27; see 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2003).
145. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 133, at 27; see 35 U.S.C. § 103
(2003).
146. 18 of the 28 substantive pages of the Examination Guidelines are devoted to the
section 101 statutory subject matter analysis.
147. See discussion supra Part II.
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IV. Software Patents in the Wild
A. Should Software be Patentable?
Having examined the evolution of the federal courts' treatment
of software patents, it is illustrative to return to the question
presented in Part I of this note-should software be patentable?
Although the issue has been decided in the courts,'4 and software
patents have caused a great deal of difficulty in the business world,149
few would argue that software patents in the abstract are not proper
subject matter for patents. Patent protection is or has been available
for nearly every processed product in existence, from the ballpoint
pen'o to the industrial process used to manufacture the latest drugs. 5'
Facially, there appears no reason why a process confined to a
computer should not be patentable in the same way that a process
confined to a beaker or an assembly line is patentable.
As noted before, the Constitution provides protection to
"Promote the Progress of Science and Useful arts"' 52 and software can
be viewed as both'53 an application of science as well as a useful art.
There is ample evidence from the record of the 1952 Patent Act that
patent protection was intended to cover "anything under the sun that
is made by man. ' 'L After a period of initial reservation,'55 federal
courts have followed this intent in finding that software may be
patented. If Congress objected to the courts' interpretation of the
1952 Patent Act to cover software, it could enact legislation to
prevent such patents. Notably, in the more than twenty years since
Diehr'56 Congress has not acted to exclude software from the scope of
patentable material.
148. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
149. See Regan, supra note 1, at 1.
150. See U.S. Patent No. D502,507, Ornamental Design for a Press-type Ballpoint Pen,
(issued Mar. 1, 2005).
151. See U.S. Patent No. 6,514,523, Carrier Particles for Drug Delivery and Process for
Preparation, (issued Feb. 4, 2003).
152. U.S. CONST., art. 1, §8.
153. Depending on what one is seeking to patent.
154. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
155. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64-66 (1972); Parker v. Book, 437 U.S.
584, 596 (1978).
156. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177-78 (1981).
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B. Prosecution and Litigation of "One-Click"
Assuming, arguendo, that software patents are here to stay, the
next question is how should the USPTO and the courts properly
handle them? The real world example of the infamous Amazon.com
"one-click" patent 57 is illustrative in showing that, given enough time
and money, the present-day patent system does work.1"
Amazon.com's patent covered the now well-known process of storing
an online shopper's billing and shipping information after a first
purchase. 5 9 The shopper can complete his or her transaction by
clicking a single button on subsequent visits.' 60
Amazon.com received its "one-click" patent on September 28,
1999,16' and immediately sued BarnesandNoble.com for
infringement. 162 A district court granted a preliminary injunction after
a five day bench trial preventing BarnesandNoble.com from using its
"Express Lane" automated checkout process.16' In holding that
Amazon had a reasonable likelihood of success at a trial on the
merits, the district court agreed with Amazon.com's contention that
the patent was nonobvious,16' and rejected Barnesandnoble.com's
assertion that the patent was covered by the prior art.16
Thirteen months later, the Federal Circuit reversed the district
court.'66 Noting that "we have several references that were urged
upon the court as invalidating the asserted claims,"' 67 the Federal
Circuit opinion held BarnesandNoble.com mounted a "serious
challenge"' ' to the validity of the patent. Although the Federal
Circuit agreed that Amazon.com met its burden to show a likelihood
of success, the court denied the preliminary injunction and remanded
157. Method and System for Placing a Purchase Order via a Communications
Network, U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999).
158. Eventually.
159. James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., March 12, 2000,
http://www.around.com/patent.html.
160. Id.
161. For a discussion of the turmoil caused by the grant of the patent, see Gnu Project,
Boycott Amazon!, http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/amazon.html.
162. Amazon.com, Inc. v. BarnesandNoble.com, Inc., 73 F.Supp.2d 1228 (W. Dist.
Wash. 1999), vacated by Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
163. Amazonacom, Inc., 73 F.Supp.2d at 1232.
164. Id. at 1237.
165. Id. at 1233.
166. Amazonrcom, Inc, 239 F.3d at 1347.
167. Id. at 1359.
168. Id. at 1360.
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the case to the district court for a trial on the merits because
BarnesandNoble.com made a serious challenge to the validity of the
patent.' 69
The case was remanded to the District Court and opening
statements were scheduled for March of 2002, roughly 2 years after
Amazon.com filed suit and 4 years after Amazon.com filed for the
original "One Click" patent. On March 7, 2002, the suit was settled on
undisclosed terms.170 Although the parameters of the settlement are
unknown, presumably the prior art uncovered during litigation served
as a deterrent against Amazon.com's asserting its patent against other
companies. As of May 21, 2004, Amazon.com has not attempted to
enforce its "One Click" patent,'17' despite the use of similar technology
by many web sites.
C. The Problem is the Process
The "One Click" litigation history shows that, given enough time
and money, a patently invalid patent will eventually be nullified
1i
However, many companies do not have the resources to fight a
protracted legal battle. Moreover, as seen in the Kodak-Sun
Microsystems litigation above, 73 companies that are not likely to
settle might rather make a "bet the company" wager on an appellate
court reversal. The least costly place to invalidate a software patent,
or any patent for that matter, is in the USPTO before a patent issues.
For a variety of reasons, software patents place a unique burden on
the USPTO, and the next section of this Note will discuss
modification to USPTO procedure that will resolve the problem at its
source.
V. Making the System More Efficient
Although it appears that, subject to the investment of significant
time and money, software patent disputes can be settled in the federal
courts, a more efficient solution would be to catch invalid patents at
the USPTO. Below are three proposals for altering existing USPTO
procedure to increase the efficacy of software patent prosecution. The
first two proposals involve technical aspects of prosecution; the third
169. Id. at 1366.
170. ComputerWire, Amazon Settles 1-Click Patent Dispute, THE REGISTER, March 8,
2002, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/03/08/amazon-settleslcick-patent-dispute.
171. Gnu Project, supra note 161.
172. Or, as in this case, effectively nullified.
173. See Regan, supra note 1.
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addresses the impact of implementing Justice Stevens' dissent in
Diehr. 74 These proposals predominantly address section 102 novelty
and section 103 non-obviousness.
A. Effective Prior Art Searches by Examiners Skilled in the Art
One of the important aspects of the novelty and obviousness
determinations made by the USPTO is that these determinations are
not made from the perspective of a layperson, but from the
perspective of one "having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains."' 75 The USPTO has historically had difficulty
hiring experienced computer scientists as patent examiners. This
problem has been known for fifteen years," 6 yet it has only been
addressed in the past three to four years. One simple expedient to
hiring and retaining qualified software patent examiners is to recruit
examiners from universities with strong computer science
departments and to pay examiners in the software technology group
salaries commensurate with entry-level positions in the industry. The
USPTO recently began offering salaries in key technology centers,
including computer science, that are commensurate with those
offered in the private sector and hopefully will be able to retain more
qualified software patent examiners in the future.
Commentators have suggested that the problem of non-obvious
software patents issuing from the USPTO is due to the lack of a
suitable prior art database for software inventions.' 77 This author
contends that a prior art database is not the solution. The majority of
objectionable software patents are similar to the "One Click" Patent
discussed above 78 in that they are not entirely described in the prior
art, but instead represent an assemblage of pre-existing parts obvious
to one skilled in the field. Although a more extensive prior art
database would be helpful, even a perfect prior art database requires
skilled examiners to make the all-important obviousness
determination.
Another important consideration for the examination of
software patents through prior art searches is the nature of technical
174. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 206 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2003).
176. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, BACKGROUND AND MANDATE OF THE ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON PATENT LAW REFORM, at 149-51 (1992).
177. See David Syrowik, Software Patents - Just Make a Good Thing Better, 2 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 113,122-24 (1996).
178. See supra Part IV.C.
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publication in the industry. Unlike the biological and material
sciences, there are relatively few academic publications devoted to
the dissemination of information about new techniques in computer
science. Creating effective prior art databases of advances in
computer science is correspondingly more difficult than in other fields
because the underlying source material for creating such a database is
not readily available. This is not to say that a prior art database would
not be useful, or that the construction of a prior art database for
computer science should not be undertaken by the USPTO. Rather, it
is an acknowledgement of the fact that computer science prior art
databases are only part of the solution and will require examiners
who are knowledgeable in the field to effectively use them.
B. Publication and Third Party Interference
Presently, applicants filing for patent protection solely in the
United States are kept secret until a patent issues. From a business
standpoint, this is a good thing, because it permits a business to apply
and prosecute patents free from the eyes of the competition.79
However, the competition is the most motivated player in finding
prior art for novelty and obviousness challenges to new patents.
Because the USPTO may never be able to keep up with the rapid
pace of change in the software industry, this proposal would
effectively outsource the job of finding prior art to the software
industry as a whole.
Although the theory of this proposal is simple, it would be
complex to implement. First, Congress would have to pass legislation
to modify 35 U.S.C. § 122180 to eliminate the option of privacy in
domestic patent applications. Second, the procedure for third party
reexamination of published patents 8' would have to be adopted to
apply to the submission of prior art in the patent prosecution process.
Although this process would require a significant overhaul of the
patent system, and would create additional overhead for the
individual patent examiners, by engaging the marketplace it would
have the benefit of making a company's software patents self-
enforcing relative to the competition.
179. 35 U.S.C. § 122(a) (2003).
180. Id.
181. See 37 C.F.Rt §§ 1.51 1.57; MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, VER.
8.2, § 2209 (2004).
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C. Stevens' Diehr Dissent
In Diehr, Justice Stevens' dissent noted two key problems with
software patents: the lack of standards for examiners regarding
patentability"" and the difficulty in determining exactly what an
unpatentable "algorithm" is relative to a patentable "process."'8 3
Justice Stevens' solution to this problem was twofold; he
recommended that no patent should be unique merely because it
involves a computer, and an explicit determination that "algorithms,"
defined as "computer programs," are not statutory subject matter for
patents. 8
Justice Stevens' first point provides valuable insight into the
debate surrounding the validity of software patents, but it does not
add much to the prosecution process. Presumably, adding a computer
to an already-known process would fail for a lack of section 103 non-
obviousness. Stevens' second assertion is likewise unworkable
1 85
because the majority of software-patents are not defined in terms of
algorithms. Rather, the majority of software patents are described in
terms of machines or processes.
VI. Conclusion
For better or worse, software patents appear to be here for good.
As shown in this Note, there is nothing inherently bad about software
patents; they merely exist to protect an inventor's time and effort of
invention in exchange for disclosure of the new invention as patents
do in a variety of fields. As with other types of patents, the ultimate
utility of software patents as a class depends largely on the care taken
in the prosecution of patent applications. Although the current
process is imperfect, the modifications discussed in this Note will add
to the utility and overall effectiveness of software patents in general.
182 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. See also State St. Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d at 1373-74 (providing a discussion
of algorithms versus processes).
184. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. This proposal would also single out software as a separate class of patents,
something that Congress and the USPTO have avoided in the 200 plus year history of
American Patents. For a critique on defining software as a separate class of patentable
material, see R Polk Wagner, Of Patents and Path Dependency: A Comment on Burk and
Lemley, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1341 (2003).
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